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Everything You Know About the United States and its Laws is WRONG ! PART ONE

Tuesday, February 7th, 2017 by

 

— The “United States” is NOT the “united States of America”

https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/2014/08/24/everything-you-know-about-the-united-states-and-

its-laws-is-wrong-the-united-states-is-not-the-united-states-of-america/

PART ONE

 by JohnHenryHill

Everything You Know About the United States and its Laws is WRONG !

 The “United States” is NOT the “United States of America”

by John-Henry Hill, M.D.

April 26, 2013; Revised August 24, 2014

“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right.” — Thomas Paine

If you wish to open and/or download this 106 page essay as a Microsoft WORD document, please click here:     The_US_Is_Not_the_USA__8-24-2014

 

Preface

Almost everything you think you know about the government of the United States of America (the Union) and its laws is WRONG. Not just a few things– but rather almost everything!

When the Union of the various states was formed, the American people were NOT illiterate peasants. They understood very well the meanings of the words and terms used in the Constitution; and they knew the difference between the Common Law, Equity (Contract) law and Admiralty law – which are the ONLY types of law allowed by the  Constitution. Indeed, the Founders and the people in general understood in such great detail the concepts on which the Union was to be founded that they put us to shame by our ignorance

The Importance of Definitions

In order to communicate more effectively many professions have developed specific vocabularies containing very precise definitions. The vocabulary in every-day English as used by the public changes greatly over relatively short periods of time. Conversely, in order to maintain precise meanings of words, the vocabulary of certain professions is very stable – words tend to retain their meanings over long periods of time. For example, in medicine the phrase “heart attack” is often used by the public. However, for a medical doctor the term “heart attack” means little – instead he would refer to a very specific cardiac event, such as a “myocardial infarction” (death of heart tissue due to insufficient blood and oxygen), an “arrythmia” (irregular heart beat caused by abnormal electrical conduction within the heart), a “ventricular fibrillation” (a specific type of arrythmia – called a “can-of-worms” electrical conduction phenomenon – in the lower-left pumping chamber of the heart which renders the pumping action completely ineffective), or some other specific term. Similarly, a very precise and stable vocabulary has developed for law and the legal profession – what some have called “legalese”. Indeed, in law many definitions have remained fairly static over centuries – and when a new term is used or a new meaning is given to an existing term or word, that term is usually explicitly defined within that new statute. The problems arise when the definitions of specialized terms used by a profession depart from the definitions used by the general public, so that the terms become misleading or totally inaccurate.

For example, the term “client” in ordinary English refers to a customer. However, in law a “client” is a man who is mentally incompetent to act on his own behalf in court. In ordinary English a “person” refers to a man, woman or child. In law, a “person” is defined as a legal fiction and a corporation. (A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. by John Bouvier. Published 1856.) Likewise in law a “human being” is defined as a “monster”; a “citizen” is defined as an “officer or employee”; the word “must” means “may”; the word “including” is inclusive – meaning it means only the items following the word “include”; and even the term the “United States” has at least very different THREE legal definitions within the U.S. Code and Supreme Court decisions.

Examples:

1.) SHALL – The following court decisions leave no doubt about the legal meaning of “Shall”. “Shall” means MAY – thus, when a statute states that you SHALL do something, it is in truth stating that you MAY or MAY NOT do that something. You are NOT obligated to do it: the choice is yours!

As against the government the word “shall” when used in statutes, is to be construed as “may,” unless a contrary intention is manifest. Cairo & Fulton R.R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 170, the U.S. Supreme Court

“Shall” in a statute may be construed to mean “may” in order to avoid constitutional doubt. George Williams College v. Village of Williams Bay, 7 N.W.2d 891, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin

If necessary to avoid unconstitutionality of a statute, “shall” will be deemed equivalent to “may” …. Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 Atlantic 136

2.) AUTOMOBILE and MOTOR VEHICLE – There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle.

“The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways.” American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200.

“A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received.” International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120.

The term ‘motor vehicle’ is different and broader than the word automobile.’”; City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232.

The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:

Motor vehicle” means every description or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and property.

“Driver” is defined as a person operating a vehicle in commerce. (that is, being paid for doing so)

Transportation” is defined as the movement of goods or people in a vehicle engaged in commerce. (A “carrier” is defined as a business engaged in the movement of goods or people in commerce – that is, being paid to do so.)

“Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes, while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways for trade, commerce, or for hire. State and the federal governments have the authority to regulate commerce within their respective jurisdictions because any business (corporation) is a “creature of the state”.  Since a corporation is a “legal fiction” created by the state, that corporation’s use of public roads for financial gain may be regulated by the state via legislated statutes. (The legal concept of financial “gain”– often called simply “gain” – is important to understand, as it means profits derived from investments and/or from the labor of other people; it does NOT mean money earned by a man’s own labor) However, under the Common Law (still the primary law in America, superseding all statutes) and numerous Supreme Court rulings, a man traveling upon a public road in a private automobile who is NOT being paid for doing so is exercising his Common Law right to travel; and is NOT subject to any legislated acts (statutes) or any regulations derived therefrom – and therefore is NOT subject to speed limits, car registration, or any of the other regulations derived from legislated statutes (acts). In Common Law, legislated statutes (acts) are NOT Law; these statutes only gain the “force of law” upon the CONSENT of each  individual man. Under the Common Law a man  commits a crime ONLY if he injures another man or that man’s property (technically, in law a man’s rights and his body are considered his own property); or causes a “disturbance of the peace”. Under the Common Law a man has the unlimited right to enter into a contract or, conversely, to NOT enter into a contract..No contract forced upon a man is considered valid, but instead is considered null and void ab initio (from its beginning). The key factor is that a man may WAIVE some of his  rights under the Common Law by entering into a CONTRACT with another party for “consideration” – the mutual exchange of things of approximately equal value. A man’s rights under the Common Law are waived to the extent specified in that particular contract; and the ancient maxim under Commercial Law then applies: “The contract makes the law.” In short, this maxim means that the terms within the contract upon which two parties voluntary agreed become the Law on which disputes regarding that contract will be settled. Applying for and receiving a state-issued “Driver’s License” is such a contract – in which you voluntarily admit that you are a “driver” operating a “motor vehicle” engaged in commerce. Therefore, by obtaining a state-issued driver’s license, you voluntarily confirmed that you are a driver engaged in commerce and thereby submit yourself to the jurisdiction of the state’s statutes and regulations. Of course, even though you may possess a driver’s license (perhaps you are a taxi driver) you may not have been getting paid for transporting people when the police stopped you for “speeding”. However, because you have a “driver’s license”, the PRESUMPTION exists that you are engaged in commerce and therefore subject to statutes and their jurisdiction. And since you probably do NOT rebut this presumption to the court (in a written, sworn affidavit prior to going to court), this unrebutted presumption is accepted as a fact in law by the court. Two maxims of law apply here: “A presumption not rebutted becomes a fact in law.” And “He, who does not object, agrees.” But let us not get too far ahead of ourselves.

The United States v the United States of America

The Constitution was a commercial compact (a CONTRACT in the form of a TRUST) between states, giving the federal government limited powers. The Bill of Rights was meant not as our source of rights, but as further limitations on the federal government. Our fore-fathers saw the potential for danger in the U. S. Constitution. To insure the Constitution was not presumed to be our source of rights, the 10th Amendment was added. I will use a quote from Thomas Jefferson, February 15, 1791, where he quotes the 10th Amendment

“I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground; That “all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.” To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”   — Thomas Jefferson

The created United States government cannot define the rights of their creator, the American people. Three forms of law were granted to the Constitution: common law, equity (contract law) and Admiralty law. Each had their own jurisdiction and purpose.

Jurisdiction has many facets dealing with the various aspects and modalities of law and justice, i.e., Tort (Civil) law, Admiralty/Law Merchant Contract law, Real Property law, Statute law, Criminal Law, and Constitutional law, to name a few of the fields of jurisprudence. The court must be sitting in the proper jurisdiction to render Justice. No court has the discretion to hear a case that falls outside of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

Most local courts today sit in the jurisdiction of Admiralty/Law Merchant Contract law utilizing the

Uniform Commercial Code as the authority for their moving.

1865 – 13th Amendmentpeople could volunteer into slavery by accepting federal benefits.

1868 – a privately owned, foreign (British) corporation called the “United States” was created and incorporated in Delaware.

1868 – The 14th Amendment defined a two new legal entities: a “citizen of the United States” and a ‘person’, both  subject to the federal government jurisdiction as “agents/officers” and/or “employees” of government. It then stated that no state could infringe or deprive any “U.S. citizen” or “person” of their “privileges and immunities” as U.S. citizens. Of great importance was the use of the terms “”privileges” and “immunities”, as opposed to “rights”. As “persons” or “citizens” (that is, agents or employees) of the private, foreign United States corporation, they had NO rights within that corporation. They possessed only privileges granted to them by that private, foreign corporation called the United States.

Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, AND subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws..”

It defined a new legal entity: a “citizen of the United States” as 1.) a person naturalized or born within the United States  AND  2.) “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”, that is, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”. Note that BOTH conditions must be fulfilled to be considered a “U.S. citizen”. Consequently, any man claiming the status of a “U.S. citizen” is affirming that he was born or naturalized in the United States AND that he is subject to the jurisdiction of the private corporation called the United States and its statutes and courts, thereby exercising his unlimited right to contract and voluntarily waiving his rights under the Common Law and guaranteed by the Constitution.

1871 – the District of Columbia Incorporation Act of 1871 was passed by Congress, creating a municipal government as a privately owned corporation that took control of  D.C. In subsequent statutes in 1882 and later passed by Congress, the federal government became, in fact , the private, foreign corporation called the “United States” incorporated in 1868 and based in Washington, D.C. Further, in subsequent statutes the term “United States” meant ONLY the “District of Columbia”; NOT the various states of the Union under the Constitution.

1913 – the Federal Reserve Central Banks were created.

1933 President Roosevelt put into effect the ‘Trading with the Enemies Act’. This applied only to Federal Citizens, aka, “U.S. citizens” as defined in the 14th Amendment

1933 – President Roosevelt took the gold away from the people, who were not lawfully required to relinquish it, and who then had no money with which to pay their debts. Since 1933, debts are never paid; they are simply “discharged”

March 9, 1933 – ownership (legal title) of all property is in the State; individual ‘ownership’ is only equitable (user) title. Use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State.   (YIKES! Read that again.)

1933 – President Roosevelt signed HJR 192 June 5, 1933 passed by Congress– since the government had taken the gold, and the people had no money, the government would pay the ‘debts’ for the people, thereby giving them unlimited credit. Whoever has the gold pays the bills. This legislation states that one cannot demand from you a certain form of currency, since any form and all forms of currency are your credit. If they do, they are in breach of Public Policy, PL 73-10. Not only does this insurance policy protect the legislators from conviction for fraud and treason but also it protects the people from damages cause by the Feds.

1938 – The U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie Railroad Company v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), decision made contracts the rule in the courts. This ruling voided the long-standing . Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 41 U. S. 18 (1842) No other law or court decisions prior to 1938 could be cited in future court cases. In effect, Erie Railroad Company v Tompkins made contracts [contract law or UCC-Admiralty Law; NOT the Common Law and the Constitution] the rule in the courts under the Commercial (Negotiable Instruments) Act. The Supreme Court ruled that all federal cases will be judged under the Negotiable Instruments Law. There would be no more decisions based on the Common Law at the federal level. Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court was dealing with Public Law, that is, the Common Law codified as statutes. Since 1938, the Supreme Court has dealt with Public Policy, that is private commercial law created through contracts.

1946 – government and court system was lost through the Administrative Procedures Act.

1965 – silver was removed as a means for paying debt, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) became the supreme law of the land concerning the Banking System, the courts were pulled together in Admiralty/Administrative and Civil (contract /commercial /corporate) Law, thereby removing the ‘innocent’ plea under the Common Law, thereby reversing ‘innocent until proven guilty’ to ‘guilty until proven innocent’. Securities replaced substance as collateral for debts; debt instruments with collateral, and accommodation parties could be used instead of money. The courts could uphold the security instruments which depended upon commercial fictions as a basis for compelling payment or performance.

1966 – The Federal Tax Lien Act: The entire taxing and monetary systems are hereby placed under the U.C.C. (Uniform Commercial Code)

The word “person” in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings. See e. g. 1 U. S. C. sec 1. Church of Scientology v. U. S. Dept. of Justice (1979) 612 F. 2d 417, 425.

One of the very first section of  STATE statutes will have a section listed entitled “Definitions.” Carefully study this section of the statutes and you will find a portion that reads similar to this excerpt.

In construing these statutes and each and every word, phrase, or part hereof, where the context will permit:

(1) The singular includes the plural and vice versa.

(2) Gender-specific language includes the other gender and neuter.

(3) The word “person” includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint adventures, partnerships, eSTATEs, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combinations. The word “person” is a fictional legal entity. A man (or woman) is real and not a legal fiction and therefore by definition is not a “person”.

NOTE HOWEVER, THE DEFINITIONS in the STATUTES DO NOT LIST MAN OR WOMAN — THEREFORE THEY ARE EXCLUDED FROM ALL THE STATUTES (legislated acts) !!!

Under the rule of construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” where a statute or Constitution enumerates the things on which it is to operate or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.

Generally words in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. When a statute does not specifically define words, such words should be construed in their common or ordinary sense to the effect that the rules used in construing statutes are also applicable in the construction of the Constitution. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that words of common usage when used in a statute should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense.

If you carefully read the statute laws enacted by your STATE legislature you will also notice that they are all written with phrases similar to these five examples :

  1. A person commits the offense of failure to carry a license if the person …
  2. A person commits the offense of failure to register a vehicle if the person …
  3. A person commits the offense of driving uninsured if the person …
  4. A person commits the offense of fishing if the person …
  5. A person commits the offense of breathing if the person …

Notice that only “persons” can commit these STATE legislature created crimes (called acts or statutes). A crime by definition is an offense committed against the “STATE.” If you commit an offense against a human, it is called a tort. Examples of torts would be any personal injury, slander, or defamation of character.

So how does someone become a “person” and subject to regulation by STATE statutes and laws?

There is ONLY one way. Contract! You must ask the STATE for permission to volunteer to become a STATE person. You must volunteer because the U. S. Constitution forbids the STATE from compelling you into slavery or involuntary servitude. This is found in the 13th and 14th Amendments.

13th Amendment
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United STATEs, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

14th Amendment: (which defined the term “citizen of the United States”)
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the STATE wherein they reside. No STATE shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any STATE deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Of great importance is that BOTH conditions must be met in order for a man to be a “citizen of the United States”: (1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States AND (2) subject to the jurisdiction thereof [the United States]. If you were born in Vermont but never agreed by contract to be “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”, then you can assert that you are a citizen of Vermont, but NOT a citizen of the United States. By doing so, you are NOT subject to any statutes (acts) passed by Congress or any Federal regulations. The “catch” is that when you walk into any court, that court makes the presumption that you are a “citizen of the United States” and therefore subject to that court’s jurisdiction. And under the Common Law, “a presumption NOT rebutted becomes a fact in law.” – meaning that you must OBJECT in writing (and verbally, often many times) to their presumption and make them prove it, since any presumption challenged (objected to) by a man in a court must be proven by that court, as the “burden of proof” always falls upon the one making the claim. Further, you could assert that you are neither a citizen of any state nor a citizen of the United States – and both that state and the United States would have to prove otherwise.

You become a STATE created statutory “person” by taking up residency with the STATE and stepping into the office of “person.” You must hold an “office” within the STATE government in order for that STATE government to regulate and control you. First comes the legislatively created office, then comes their control. If you do not have an office in STATE government, the legislature’s control over you would also be prohibited by the Declaration of Rights section, usually found to be either Section I or II, of the STATE Constitution.

The most common office held in a STATE is therefore the office known as “person.” Your STATE legislature created this office as a way to control people. It is an office most people occupy without even knowing that they are doing so.

The legislature cannot lawfully control you because you are a flesh and blood human being. God alone created you and by Right of Creation, He alone can control you. It is the nature of Law, that what One creates, One controls. This natural Law is the force that binds a creature to its creator. God created us and we are, therefore, subject to His Laws, whether or not we acknowledge Him as our Creator.

The way the STATE gets around God’s Law and thereby controls the People is by creating only an office, and not a real human. This office is titled as “person” and then the legislature claims that you are filling that office. Legislators erroneously now think that they can make laws that also control men. They create entire bodies of laws – motor vehicle code, building code, compulsory education laws, and so on ad nauseum. They still cannot control men or women, but they can now control the office they created. And look who is sitting in that office of a “person” — YOU.

Then they create government departments to administer regulations to these offices. Within these administrative departments of STATE government are hundreds of other STATE created offices. There is everything from the office of janitor to the office of governor. But these administrative departments cannot function properly unless they have subjects to regulate.

The legislature obtains these subjects by creating an office that nobody even realizes to be an official STATE office.

They have created the office of “person.”

The STATE creates many other offices such as police officer, prosecutor, judge etc. and everyone understands this concept. However, what most people fail to recognize and understand is the most common STATE office of all, the office of “person.” Anyone filling one of these STATE offices is subject to regulation by their creator, the STATE legislature. Through the STATE created office of “person,” the STATE gains its authority to regulate, control and judge you, the real human. What they have done is apply the natural law principle, “what one creates, one controls.”

A look in Webster’s dictionary reveals the origin of the word “person.” It literally means “the mask an actor wears.” The “person” or “persona” is NOT the real man or woman; rather it is an artificial representation;  a false image of the man or woman.

The legislature creates the office of “person” which is a mask. They cannot create real people, only God can do that. But they can create the “office” of “person,” which is merely a mask, and then they persuade a flesh and blood human being to put on that mask by offering a fictitious privilege, such as a driver license. Now the legislature has gained complete control over both the mask and the actor behind the mask.

 Common law

Distinctions between areas of jurisdiction are typically codified in a national constitution. In most common law systems, jurisdiction is conceptually divided between jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case and jurisdiction over the personae of the litigants. (See personal jurisdiction.) Sometimes a court may exercise jurisdiction over property located within the perimeter of its powers without regard to personal jurisdiction over the litigants; this is called jurisdiction in rem.

A court whose subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to certain types of controversies (for example, suits in admiralty or suits where the monetary amount sought is less than a specified sum) is sometimes referred to as a court of special jurisdiction or court of limited jurisdiction.

A court whose subject-matter is not limited to certain types of controversy is referred to as a court of general jurisdiction. In the United States, each state has courts of general jurisdiction; most states also have some courts of limited jurisdiction. Federal courts (those operated by the federal government) are courts of limited jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction is divided into federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. The United States District Courtsmay hear only cases arising under federal law and treaties, cases involving ambassadors, admiralty cases, controversies between states or between a state and citizens of another state, lawsuits involving citizens of different states, and against foreign states and citizens.

Certain courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court and most state supreme courts, have discretionary jurisdiction, meaning that they can choose which cases to hear from among all the cases presented on appeal. Such courts generally only choose to hear cases that would settle important and controversial points of law. Though these courts have discretion to deny cases they otherwise could adjudicate, no court has the discretion to hear a case that falls outside of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

Executive Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction also denotes the area over which the executive or legislative powers or laws of a government extend. Similarly, the term also denotes the territory over which a state exerts or claims sovereignty or power (sometimes known as territorial jurisdiction).

In private international law, a supranational organization (e.g. the European Union), a nation-state, or a province (i.e. a subnational “state”) in a federation (as can be found in Australia, Brazil, India, Mexico and the United States), may all exercise jurisdiction although the problem of forum shopping is growing.

The “most sacred of liberties” of which Justice Tolman spoke was personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:

“Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property…and is regarded as inalienable.” 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987.

 “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.

 “To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land.” Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15.

“We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389.

“Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public.” Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660.

“Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee.” Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018; 16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect.81.

“Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them.” Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526.

 When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control its creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation (charters). Corporations who use the roads in the course of business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference between a corporation and an individual.

The United States Supreme Court has stated:

“…We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him.

“He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land [the Common Law] long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that purpose.” [emphasis added] Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75 (1905)

We know that Hale v. Henkel was decided in 1905 in the U. S. Supreme Court.

Since it was the U.S. Supreme Court, the case is binding on all courts of the land, until another U.S. Supreme Court case says it isn’t. Has another Supreme Court case overturned Hale v. Henkel? The answer is NO. As a matter of fact, since 1905, the Supreme Court has cited Hale v. Henkel a total of 144 times. A fact more astounding is that since 1905, Hale v. Henkel has been cited by all of the federal and STATE appellate court systems a total of over 1600 times. None of the various issues of this case has ever been overruled.

Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the State’s admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business for profit.

“..Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier [corporation] in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege.Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 657l, 168, p.516.

It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order to reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or “privilege.” We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a “Right to use the road” and what is a “privilege to use the road”. Once reaching this determination, we shall then apply those positions to modern case decision.

“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.

and…

“The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime.” Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489.

and…

“There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional Rights.” Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946.

Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of

 1938 – Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins made contracts the rule in the courts – Commercial (Negotiable Instruments) Law. The Supreme Court ruled that all federal cases will be judged under the Negotiable Instruments Law. There would be no more decisions based on the Common Law at the federal level. Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court was dealing with Public Law; since 1938, the Supreme Court has dealt with Public Policy. The charge that Mr. This overturned a standing decision of over one hundred years, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842), which was a very similar case, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Swift v Tyson was that in any case of this type, the Court would judge the case on Common Law of the state where the incident occurred – in this case Pennsylvania. Further, since the Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins 1938 ruling, NO other law (or Supreme Court ruling) prior to 1938 can be cited in cases in court.

You must realise that the Court you are standing in is an Admiralty/Law Merchant Court under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which recognizes only two classes of entities, “Creditors” and “Debtors.”, dealing only in the terms and conditions of “Contractual Obligations.” It is NOT a Constitutional Court of proper jurisdiction to secure the Rights of Sovereign Citizens.

YOU MUST ESTABLISH THE PROPER JURISDICTION!

Common law

Distinctions between areas of jurisdiction are typically codified in a national constitution. In most common law systems, jurisdiction is conceptually divided between jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case and jurisdiction over the personae of the litigants. (See personal jurisdiction.) Sometimes a court may exercise jurisdiction over property located within the perimeter of its powers without regard to personal jurisdiction over the litigants; this is called jurisdiction in rem.

A court whose subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to certain types of controversies (for example, suits in admiralty or suits of equity where the monetary amount sought is less than a specified sum) is sometimes referred to as a court of special jurisdiction or court of limited jurisdiction.

A court whose subject-matter is not limited to certain types of controversy is referred to as a court of general jurisdiction. [NOTE: ONLY a Common Law court can be a “court of record“ and thus a court of general jurisdiction.] In the United States, each state has courts of general jurisdiction; most states also have some courts of limited jurisdiction. Federal courts (those operated by the federal government) are courts of special or limited jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction is divided into federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. The United States District Courts may hear only cases arising under federal law and treaties, cases involving ambassadors, admiralty cases, controversies between states or between a state and citizens of another state, lawsuits involving citizens of different states, and against foreign states and citizens. These controversies between states or between people from different states are called “jurisdictional diversity” cases and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts.

Certain courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court and most state supreme courts, have discretionary jurisdiction, meaning that they can choose which cases to hear from among all the cases presented on appeal. Such courts generally only choose to hear cases that would settle important and controversial points of law. Though these courts have discretion to deny cases they otherwise could adjudicate, no court has the discretion to hear a case that falls outside of its subject-matter jurisdiction.

The first issue I want to cover is the United States flag. Obviously from known history our flag did not have a yellow fringe bordering three sides. The United States did not start putting flags with a yellow fringe on them in government buildings and public buildings until 1959. Of course the question you would ask yourself; why did it change and are there any legal meanings behind this? Oh yes!

First the appearance of our flag is defined in Title 4 sec. 1. U.S.C..

“The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field.” (Note – of course when new states are admitted new stars are added.)

A foot note was added on page 1113 of the same section which says:

“Placing of fringe on the national flag, the dimensions of the flag, and arrangement of the stars are matters of detail not controlled by statute, but within the discretion of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Army and Navy.” – 1925, 34 Op.Atty.Gen. 483.

The president as military commander can add a yellow fringe to our flag. When would this be done? During a time of war. Why? A flag with a fringe is an ensign, a military flag. Read the following.

“Pursuant to U.S.C. Chapter 1, 2, and 3; Executive Order No. 10834, August 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865, a military flag is a flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a YELLOW FRINGE, bordered on three sides. The President of the United states designates this deviation from the regular flag, by executive order, and in his capacity as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Armed forces.”

From the National Encyclopedia, Volume 4:

“Flag, an emblem of a nation; usually made of cloth and flown from a staff. From a military standpoint flags are of two general classes, those flown from stationary masts over army posts, and those carried by troops in formation. The former are referred to by the general name flags. The latter are called colors when carried by dismounted troops. Colors and Standards are more nearly square than flags and are made of silk with a knotted Fringe of Yellow on three sides………..use of the flag. The most general and appropriate use of the flag is as a symbol of authority and power.”

The reason I started with the Flag issue is because it is so easy to grasp. The main problem I have with the yellow fringe is that its use indicates that our Constitutional Republic no longer exists. Our system of law was changed without the public’s knowledge. It was kept secret. This is fraud. The American people were allowed to believe this was just a decoration. Because the law changed from Common Law (God’s Law) to Admiralty Law (the kings law) your status also changed from sovereign to subject. Formerly, you were able to own property (allodial title) and to do whatever you wished on that property, with no need for any licenses or to pay property taxes. Since 1933 people do NOT own their property, but rather possess “equitable title” which grants them the “right of use” of that property, but NOT true ownership. Thus, they are no longer the true owners, but are legally considered tenants on the land. If you still think you own your property, stop paying taxes – and soon thereafter, your home and property will be seized by the government under the “prize law” under Admiralty jurisdiction.

“The ultimate ownership of all property is in the state; individual so-called `ownership’ is only by virtue of government, i.e., law, amounting to a mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State.” – Senate Document No. 43, “Contracts payable in Gold” written in 1933.

By our allowing these military flags to fly, the American people have admitted our defeat and loss of status. Read on, you’ll see what I mean. Remember the Constitution recognizes three forms of law: the Common Law (the “law of the land”), Equity Law (legislated acts; as statutes, codes, regulations, ordinances, by-laws, etc.) and Admiralty Law (the “law of the sea”; “Law Merchant”; “Maritime-Admiralty Law”; the “Law of Commerce”; or “commercial law”). The familiar “Stars and Stripes” flag is NOT the official U.S. flag. Indeed, before World War 2, most public and private buildings within a state flew ONLY their state flag. Each state considered itself a “sovereign nation” with respect to the other states and with respect to the United States – and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this as a fact in law. Therefore, for a state-owned building to fly a U.S. flag would mean that it had surrendered its sovereignty and was now under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government. Only Federal buildings under civilian control, such as the Post Office, flew the “U.S. Civil Flag of Peacetime”, most notable for its vertical stripes and its blue stars on a white field (background) This U.S. Civil Flag of Peacetime (pictured immediately below) is the true official flag of the United States of America.

CURRUPTIONCURRUPTIONMost Americans are unaware of this fact; and those who are aware believe it to be meaningless. However, under U.S. and international Maritime law, the “Law of the Flag” (which is a legal concept first developed under Maritime-Admiralty Law) is still of major legal importance, since the flag you display signals the nation under whose legal jurisdiction you are governed, on land and, most importantly, on a ship at sea. Operating a ship at sea using an unauthorized flag (not registered with a particular nation) was a most serious offense; it was called a “false flag” or “false colors” or not showing your “true colors”. If a ship was caught flying a “false flag”, the ship and its cargo were subject to confiscation and its captain (and possibly even its crew) subject to the death penalty by an Admiralty court hearing issuing a “summary judgment” – no trial by jury. Only two issues were considered: the fact that the ship flew a “false flag” and whether the captain possessed the proper Certificate of Registration from that nation authorizing him to fly that flag. That ship and its captain (and often its crew) were thereby considered “outlaws”, meaning that they were “outside the law” and therefore had forfeited all their rights and legal protections under the law. So-called “pirates” were an example of such “outlaws”.

CURRUPTIONCURRUPTIONCURRUPTIONThe following is a legal definition of the term Law of the Flag.

“…The agency of the master is devolved upon him by the law of the flag. The same law that confers his authority ascertains its limits, and the flag at the mast-head is notice to all the world of the extent of such power to bind the owners or freighters by his act. The foreigner who deals with this agent has notice of that law, and, if he be bound by it [that is, if he consents], there is not injustice. His notice is the national flag which is hoisted on every sea and under which the master sails into every port, and every circumstance that connects him with the vessel isolates that vessel in the eyes of the world, and demonstrates his relation to the owners and freighters as their agent for a specific purpose and with power well defined under the national maritime law.” – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914.

Don’t be misled by the fact they are talking about the sea, and presume that the “law of the flag” does not apply on land, I will prove to you that Admiralty law has come onto land. Next a court case:

“Pursuant to the “Law of the Flag”, a military flag does result in jurisdictional implication when flown. The Plaintiff cites the following: “Under what is called international law, the law of the flag, a shipowner who sends his vessel into a foreign port gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the shipmaster that he intends the law of the flag to regulate those contracts with the shipmaster that he either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all.” – Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41, 45, 185 ILL. 133, 49 LRA 181, 76 AM.

When you walk into a court and see this flag (with yellow fringe) you are put on notice that you are in a Admiralty Court and that the king is in control. Also, if there is a king, the people are no longer sovereign. You’re probably saying this is the most incredible thing I have ever heard. YOU have read the proof, it will stand up in court. But wait, there is more, you probably would say, how could this happen? Here’s how. Admiralty law is for the sea, maritime law governs contracts between parties that trade over the sea. Well, that’s what our fore-fathers intended. However, in 1845 Congress passed an act saying Admiralty law could come on land. The bill may be traced in Cong. Globe, 28th Cong., 2d. Sess. 43, 320, 328, 337, 345(1844-45), no opposition to the Act is reported. Congress held a committee on this subject in 1850 and they said:

“The committee also alluded to “the great force” of “the great constitutional question as to the power of Congress to extend maritime jurisdiction beyond the ground occupied by it at the adoption of the Constitution….” – Ibid. H.R. Rep. No. 72 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1850)

It was up to the Supreme Court to stop Congress and say NO! The Constitution did not give you that power, nor was it intended. But no, the courts began a long train of abuses, here are some excerpts from a few court cases.

“This power is as extensive upon land as upon water. The Constitution makes no distinction in that respect. And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the commerce is between different States. And it may embrace also the vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on (my note – remember what the law of the flag said when you receive benefits from the king.) It would be in the power of Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon its courts, over the cars engaged in transporting passengers or merchandise from one State to another, and over the persons engaged in conducting them, and deny to the parties the trial by jury. Now the judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, has never been supposed to extend to contracts made on land and to be executed on land. But if the power of regulating commerce can be made the foundation of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits, may be created on water under that authority, the same reason would justify the same exercise of power on land.” Propeller Genessee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et al. 12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851)   U.S. Supreme Court

And all the way back, before the U.S. Constitution John Adams talking about his state’s Constitution, said:

“Next to revenue (taxes) itself, the late extensions of the jurisdiction of the admiralty are our greatest grievance. The American Courts of Admiralty seem to be forming by degrees into a system that is to overturn our Constitution and to deprive us of our best inheritance, the laws of the land. It would be thought in England a dangerous innovation if the trial, of any matter on land was given to the admiralty.— Jackson v. Magnolia, 20 How. 296 315, 342 (U.S. 1852)

This began the most dangerous precedent of all the Insular Cases. This is where Congress took a boundless field of power. When legislating for the states, they are bound by the Constitution, when legislating for their insular possessions they are not restricted in any way by the Constitution. Read the following quote from the Harvard law review of AMERICAN INS. CO. v. 356 BALES OF COTTON, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828), relative to our insular possessions:

“These courts, then, are not constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the united States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is conferred in the third article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.” — Harvard Law Review, Our New Possessions. page 481.

Here are some Court cases that make it even clearer:

“…[T]he United States may acquire territory by conquest or by treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the power of Congress conferred by Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution…” “In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for the United States. …And in general the guaranties of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power over territory belonging to the United States, has made those guarantees applicable.” — Hooven & Allison & Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)

“The idea prevails with some indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar that we have in this country substantially or practically two national governments; one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise.”

“I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism.”

“It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the constitution.” — Downes vs Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

These actions allowed Admiralty law to come on land. If you will remember the definition of the Law of the Flag. When you receive benefits or enter into contracts with the king you come under his law which is Admiralty law. And what is a result of your connection with the king? A loss of your Sovereign status. Our ignorance of the law is no excuse. I’ll give you an example, something you deal with everyday. Let’s say you get a seat belt ticket. What law did you violate? Remember the Constitution recognizes three forms of law. Was it common law? Who was the injured party? No one. So it could not have been common law even though here, the State of N. C. has made chapter 20 of the Motor Vehicle code carry common law penalties, jail time. This was the only thing they could do to cover up the jurisdiction they were operating in. Was it Equity law? No, there is no contract in dispute, driving is a privilege granted by the king. If it were a contract the UCC would apply, and it doesn’t. In a contract both parties have equal rights. In a privilege, you do as you are told or the privilege is revoked. Well guess what, there is only one form of law left, admiralty. Ask yourself when did licenses begin to be required? 1933.

All district courts are admiralty courts,   see the Judiciary Act of 1789.

“It is only with the extent of powers possessed by the district courts, acting as instance courts of admiralty, we are dealing. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gives the entire constitutional power to determine “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” leaving the courts to ascertain its limits, as cases may arise.” — Waring ET AL,. v. Clarke, Howard 5 12 L. ed. 1847

When you enter a court room and come before the judge and the U.S. flag with the yellow fringe flying, you are put on notice of the law you are in. American’s aren’t aware of this, so they continue to claim Constitutional rights. In the Admiralty setting the Constitution does NOT apply and the judge, if pushed, will inform you of this by placing you under contempt for continuing to bring it up. If the judge is pressed, he will probably state that it is statutory law and he has “statutory jurisdiction”. Where are the rules and regulations for statutory law kept? They don’t exist. If statuary law existed, there would be rules and regulations governing its procedures and court rules. They do not exist!!!

The way you know this is Admiralty, is from the yellow fringed flag and from the actions of the law, compelled performance (Admiralty). The judges can still move at common law (murder, etc.) and equity (contract disputes etc.). It’s up to the type of case brought before the court. If the case is Admiralty, the only way back to the common law is the saving to suitor clause and action under Admiralty. The court and rules of all three jurisdictions have been blended. Under Admiralty you are compelled to perform under the agreement you made by asking and receiving the king’s government (license). You receive the benefit of driving on federal roads (military roads), so you have voluntarily obligated yourself to this system of law, this is why you are compelled to obey. If you don’t it will cost you money or jail time or both. The type of offence determines the jurisdiction you come under, but the court itself is an Admiralty court, defined by the flag. Driving without a seat belt under Chapter 20 DMV code carries a criminal penalty for a non common law offense. Again, where is the injured party or parties? – There are NO injured parties and thus this is Admiralty law. Here is a quote to prove what I said about the roads being military, this is only one benefit, there are many:

“Whilst deeply convinced of these truths, I yet consider it clear that under the war-making power Congress may appropriate money toward the construction of a military road when this is absolutely necessary for the defense of any State or Territory of the Union against foreign invasion. Under the Constitution Congress has power “to declare war,” “to raise and support armies,” “to provide and maintain a navy,” and to call forth the militia to “repel invasions.” Thus endowed, in an ample manner, with the war-making power, the corresponding duty is required that “the United States shall protect each of them [the States] against invasion.” Now, how is it possible to afford this protection to California and our Pacific possessions except by means of a military road through the Territories of the United States, over which men and munitions of war may be speedily transported from the Atlantic States to meet and to repel the invader?…. Besides, the Government, ever since its origin, has been in the constant practice of constructing military roads.” — Inaugural Address of James Buchanan, March 4, 1857, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902.

I want to briefly mention the Social Security Act, the nexus Agreement you have with the king. You were told the SS# was for retirement and you had to have it to work. It sounds like a license to me, and it is, it is a license granted by the President to work in this country, under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended in March 9, 1933, as you will see in a moment. Was it really for your retirement? What does F.I.C.A. stand for? Federal Insurance Contribution Act. What does contribution mean at law, not Webster’s Dictionary. This is where they were able to get you to admit that you were jointly responsible for the national debt, and you declared that you were a fourteenth Amendment citizen [of the UNITED STATES CORPORATION]..

As mentioned above, on April 25, 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842), the standing precedents of the prior 150 years concerning the “Common Law” in the federal government. (ERIE RAILROAD CO. vs. TOMPKINS, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188; (1938))

“THERE IS NO FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO DECLARE SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF COMMON LAW applicable IN A STATE, WHETHER they be LOCAL or GENERAL in their nature, be they COMMERCIAL LAW or a part of LAW OF TORTS.” (See: ERIE RAILROAD CO. vs. TOMPKINS, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188; (1938) In short, in Erie RR v Tompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that henceforth within the United States, ALL crimes would be considered COMMERCIAL crimes – that is, subject to Contract Law (Commercial Law; Maritime-Admiralty); and NOT to the Common Law, thereby voiding the Constitution and all legal precedence since Colonial times. Further, under Commercial Law, rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution were OPTIONAL upon the courts (“privileges” that the court may or may not see fit to grant) – so a 12-person “trial by jury” under the Common Law and guaranteed by the Constitution was no longer required. A judge could decide on his own whether to issue a “summary judgment” upon a defendant with no trial by jury; or he could decide to offer a defendant a “jury trial” (composed of as few jurors as the judge wished; thus NOT a true “trial by jury” of 12 people; or the judge could offer the defendant a “jury trial”, but any “verdict” of this jury was no longer lawfully binding on the judge, but instead was considered only an “advisory opinion” to the judge, which the judge could accept or reject as he wished. Thus, if a man was found “not guilty” by the jury in a “jury trial” under Commercial Law, the judge legally could ignore the jury’s verdict and declare that man “guilty”. To repeat, since the 1938 Erie RR v Tompkins case, ALL crimes and offences in the United States are considered to be “commercial crimes” in relation to the 1933 Bankruptcy Act of the United States and under which ALL U.S. citizens are considered “debtors” as surety for the debt owed by the U.S. government to foreign banks.

On May 18, 1951 during a joint meeting with the American Law Institute in Washington, D.C., the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was approved. Later that year the ABA formally approved the code as well. Considered the outstanding accomplishment of the Conference, the Code remains the ULC’s signature product. One of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute governing commercial transactions (including sales and leasing of goods, transfer of funds, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, investment securities, and secured transactions). By 1968, the U.S. government, 49 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. Virgin Islands had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) — the only exception being Louisiana. (See: Blacks Law, 6th Ed. pg. 1531) In essence, all court decisions are based on commercial law or business law and has criminal penalties associated with it. Rather than openly calling this new law Admiralty/Maritime Jurisdiction, judges will often refer to it as “Statutory Jurisdiction”.

I want to briefly mention the Social Security Act, the nexus Agreement you have with the king. You were told the SS# was for retirement and you had to have it to work. It sounds like a license to me, and it is, it is a license granted by the President to work in this country, under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended in March 9, 1933, as you will see in a moment. Was it really for your retirement? What does F.I.C.A. stand for? Federal Insurance Contribution Act. What does contribution mean at law, not Webster’s Dictionary. This is where they were able to get you to admit that you were jointly responsible for the national debt, and you declared that you were a fourteenth Amendment citizen [of the UNITED STATES CORPORATION]..

Please read carefully the following definition regarding Social Security to learn what it means to have a SS# and pay a contribution:

Contribution: Right of one who has discharged a common liability to recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear. Under principle of “contribution,” a tort-feasor [wrong doer] against whom a judgement is rendered is entitled to recover proportional shares of judgement from other joint tort-feasor [wrong doer] whose negligence contributed to the injury and who were also liable to the plaintiff. (Note – tort feasor means wrong doer; what did you do to be defined as a wrong doer???) The share of a loss payable by an insure when contracts with two or more insurers cover the same loss. The insurer’s share of a loss under a coinsurance or similar provision. The sharing of a loss or payment among several. The act of any one or several of a number of co-debtors, co-sureties, etc., in reimbursing one of their number who has paid the whole debt or suffered the whole liability, each to the extent of his proportionate share. — (Blacks Law Dictionary 6th ed.)

Guess what? It gets worse. What does this date 1933 mean? Well you better sit down. First, remember World War I, in 1917 President Wilson declared the War Powers Act of October 6, 1917, basically stating that he was stopping all trade with the enemy except for those he granted a license, excluding Americans. Read the following from this Trading with the enemy Act, where he defines enemy: In the War Powers Act of 1917, Chapter 106, Section 2 (c) it says that these declared war powers did NOT affect citizens of the United States:

“Such other individuals, or body or class of individuals, as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United States is at war, OTHER THAN CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, wherever resident or wherever doing business, as the President, if he shall find the safety of the United States of the successful prosecution of the war shall so require, may, by proclamation, include within the term “enemy.” [thus: the PEOPLE of America became the “alien enemy”]

Now, this leads us up to 1933. Our country was recovering from a depression and now was declared bankrupt. I know you are saying. Do What, the American people were never told about this? Public policy and National Security overruled the public right to know. Read the following Congressional quote:

“My investigation convinced me that during the last quarter of a century the average production of gold has been falling off considerably. The gold mines of the world are practically exhausted. There is only about $11,000,000,000 in gold in the world, with the United States owning a little more than four billions. We have more than $100,000,000,000 in debts payable in gold of the present weight and fineness. . . As a practical proposition these contracts cannot be collected in gold for the obvious reason that the gold supply of the entire world is not sufficient to make payment.” — Congressional Record, Congressman Dies, March 15, 1933

Before 1933 all contracts with the government were payable in gold. Now I ask you? Who in their right mind would enter into contracts totaling One Hundred billion dollars in gold, when there was only eleven billion in gold in the whole world, and we had about four billion. To keep from being hung by the American public they obeyed the banksters demands and turned over our country to them. They never came out and said we were in bankruptcy but, the fact remains, we are. In 1933 the gold of the whole country had to be turned in to the banksters, and all government contracts in gold were canceled. This is bankruptcy.

“Mr. Speaker, we are here now in chapter 11 [bankruptcy]. Members of Congress are official trustees presiding over the greatest reorganization of any bankrupt entity in world history, the U.S. government.” — Congressman Traficant on the House floor, March 17, 1933

The wealth of the nation including our land was turned over to the banksters. In return, the nation’s 100 billion dollar debt was forgiven. I have two papers that have circulated the country on this subject. Remember Jesus said “money is the root of all evil” The Congress of 1933 sold every American into slavery to protect their asses. Read the following Congressional quotes:

“I want to show you where the people are being imposed upon by reason of the delegation of this tremendous power. I invite your attention to the fact that section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that whenever the Government of the United States issues and delivers money, Federal Reserve notes, which are based on the credit of the Nation–they represent a mortgage upon your home and my home, and upon all the property of all the people of the Nation–to the Federal Reserve agent, an interest charge shall be collected for the Government.” — Congressional Record, Congressman Patman, March 13, 1933

“That is the equity of what we are about to do. Yes; you are going to close us down. Yes; you have already closed us down, and have been doing it long before this year. Our President says that for 3 years we have been on the way to bankruptcy. We have been on the way to bankruptcy longer than 3 years. We have been on the way to bankruptcy ever since we began to allow the financial mastery of this country gradually to get into the hands of a little clique that has held it right up until they would send us to the grave.” — Congressional Record, Congressman Long, March 11, 1933

What did Roosevelt do? Sealed our fate and our children’s fate, but worst of all, he declared War on the American People. Remember the War Powers Act, the Trading with the enemy Act? He declared emergency powers with his authority being the War Powers Act, the Trading with the enemy Act. The problem is he redefined who the enemy was, read the following: (remember what I said about the SS# being a license to work)

The declared National Emergency of March 9, 1933 amended the War Powers Act to include the American People as enemies:

“In Title 1, Section 1 it says: The actions, regulations, rules, licenses, orders and proclamations heretofore or hereafter taken, promulgated, made, or issued by the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Treasury since March 4, 1933, pursuant to the authority conferred by subdivision (b) of section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and confirmed.”

“Section 2. Subdivision (b) of section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, (40 Stat. L. 411), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, BY ANY PERSON WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR ANY PLACE SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF.”

Here is the legal phrase ”subject to the jurisdiction thereof”, but at law this refers to alien enemy and also applies to Fourteenth Amendment citizens:

“As these words are used in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, providing for the citizenship of all persons born or naturalized in the United States AND subject to the jurisdiction thereof, the purpose would appear to have been to exclude by the fewest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common Law), the two classes of cases, children born of *ALIEN ENEMIES (emphasis mine), in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state, both of which, by the law of England and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.” – United States v Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649, 682, 42 L Ed 890, 902, 18 S Ct 456. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary

Congressman Beck had this to say about the War Powers Act:

“I think of all the damnable heresies that have ever been suggested in connection with the Constitution, the doctrine of emergency is the worst. It means that when Congress declares an emergency there is no Constitution. This means its death….But the Constitution of the United States, as a restraining influence in keeping the federal government within the carefully prescribed channels of power, is moribund, if not dead. We are witnessing its death-agonies, for when this bill becomes a law, if unhappily it becomes law, there is no longer any workable Constitution to keep the Congress within the limits of its constitutional powers.” – Congressman James Beck in Congressional Record 1933

The following are excerpts from the Senate Report, 93rd Congress, November 19, 1973, Special Committee On The Termination Of The National Emergency United States Senate. They were going to terminate all emergency powers, but they found out they did not have the power to do this, so guess which one stayed in, the Emergency Act of 1933, the Trading with the Enemy Act October 6, 1917 as amended in March 9, 1933.

Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency….Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may: seize property; organize and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and, in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens.”

“A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency rule. For 40 (now 63) years [since 1917], freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency….from, at least, the Civil War in important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency.” – Senate Report, 93rd Congress, November 19, 1973

You may be asking yourself is this the law, and if so where is it, read the following: In Title 12 U.S.C, in section 95b you’ll find the following codification of the Emergency War Powers:

“The actions, regulations, rules, licenses, orders and proclamations heretofore or hereafter taken, promulgated, made, or issued by the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Treasury since March 4, 1933, pursuant to the authority conferred by subsection (b) of section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended (12 U.S.C., 95a), are hereby approved and confirmed.” – (March 9, 1933, c. 1, Title 1, 1, 48 Stat. 1)

So you can further understand the word Alien Enemy and what it means to be declared an enemy of this government, read the following definitions: The phrase Alien Enemy is defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary as:

One who owes allegiance to the adverse belligerent. – 1 Kent 73.

He who owes a temporary but not a permanent allegiance is an alien enemy in respect to acts done during such temporary allegiance only; and when his allegiance terminates, his hostile character terminates also; -1 B. & P.163.

Alien enemies are said to have no rights, no privileges, unless by the king’s special favor, during time of war; – 1 Bla. Com. 372; Bynkershoek 195; 8 Term 166. [Remember we’ve been under a declared state of war since October 6, 1917, as amended March 9, 1933 to include every United States citizen.]

“The phrase Alien Enemy is defined in Words and Phrases as: Residence of person in territory of nation at war with United States was sufficient to characterize him as “alien enemy” within Trading with the Enemy Act, even if he had acquired and retained American citizenship.” – Matarrese v. Matarrese, 59 A.2d 262, 265, 142 N.J. Eq. 226.

“Residence or doing business in a hostile territory is the test of an “alien enemy: within meaning of Trading with the Enemy Act and Executive Orders thereunder.” – Executive Order March 11, 1942, No. 9095, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix 6; Trading with the Enemy Act 5 (b). In re Oneida Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Utica, 53 N.Y.S. 2d. 416, 420, 421, 183 Misc. 374.

“By the modern phrase, a man who resides under the allegiance and protection of a hostile state for commercial purposes is to be considered to all civil purposes as much an `alien enemy’ as if he were born there.” – Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. 119, 122.

Am I done with the proof? Not quite, believe it or not, it gets worse. I have established that war has been declared against the American people and their children. The American people that voted for the 1933 government were responsible for Congress’ actions, because Congress was there in their proxy. What is one of the actions taken against an enemy during time of War. In the Constitution the Congress was granted the power during the time of war to grant Letters of Marque. What is a letter of Marque? Well, read the following:

Letter of Marque: A commission granted by the government to a private individual, to take the property of a foreign state, as a reparation for an injury committed by such state, its citizens or subjects. The prizes so captured are divided between the owners of the privateer, the captain, and the crew. – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1914.

Think about the mission of the IRS, they are a private organization, or their backup, the ATF. These groups have been granted letters of Marque, read the following:

“The trading with the enemy Act, originally and as amended, in strictly a war measure, and finds its sanction in the provision empowering Congress “to declare war, grant letters of Marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.” — Stoehr v. Wallace 255 U.S.

Under the Constitution the Power of the Government had its checks and balances, power was divided between the three branches of government. To do anything else means you no longer have a Constitutional government. I’m not even talking about the obvious, which we have already covered, read the following:

“The Secretary of the Treasury and/or the Attorney General may require, by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, or otherwise, any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, from time to time and at any time or times, complete information relative to, any transaction referred to in section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917.” — Title 12 Banks and Banking page 570.

How about Clinton’s new Executive Order of June 6, 1994 where the Alphabet agencies are granted their own power to obtain money and the military if need be to protect themselves. These are un-elected officials, sounds un-Constitutional to me, but read on.

“The delegations of authority in this Order shall not affect the authority of any agency or official pursuant to any other delegation of presidential authority, presently in effect or hereafter made, under section 5 (b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as amended (12 U.S.C. 95a)”

How can the President delegate to un-elected officials power that he was elected to have, and declare that it cannot be taken away, by the voters or the courts or Congress. I tell you how, under martial law, under the War Powers Act. The American public is asleep and is unaware nor do they care about what is going on, because it may interfere with their making money. I guess Thomas Jefferson was right again:

“…And to preserve their independence, we must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy and liberty or profusion and servitude. If we run into such debts as that we must be taxed in our meat and in our drink, in our necessaries and our comforts, in our labors and our amusements, for our callings and our creeds, as the people of England are, our people, like them, must come to labor sixteen hours in the twenty-four, and give the earnings of fifteen of these to the government for their debts and daily expenses; and the sixteenth being insufficient to afford us bread, we must live, as they now do, on oatmeal and potatoes; have not time to think, no means of calling the mismanager’s to account; but be glad to obtain subsistence by hiring ourselves to rivet their chains on the necks of our fellow sufferers…” — (Thomas Jefferson) THE MAKING OF AMERICA, p. 395

While former U.S. Senator Lloyd Bentsen was simultaneously the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States:

Submitted January 28

Lloyd Bentsen, of Texas, to be U.S. Governor of the International Monetary Fund for a term of 5 years; U.S. Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 5 years; U.S. Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of 5 years; U.S. Governor of the African Development Bank for a term of 5 years; U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bank; U.S. Governor of African Development Fund; and U.S. Governor of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.” — Presidential Documents, February 1, 1993.

At the same time, Bentsen was the Secretary of Treasury. Gee, I don’t know, this sounds like a conflict of entrust and interest to me, how about you? Also, Congress is the only one under the Constitution able to appropriate money.

How about a few months ago when Secretary of Treasury Rubin sent hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to Mexico, without Congress’ approval. Secretary of Treasury Rubin previously had been president of the bank that made the loans to Mexico. Later, when he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury, he had the Treasury Mexico’s interest on its debt to his bank with taxpayers money. Again, sounds like a conflict of interest (entrust) to me.

“Without limitation as to any other powers or authority of the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General under any other provision of this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and empowered to prescribe from time to time regulations, rulings, and instructions to carry out the purposes of this Order and to provide therein or otherwise the conditions under which licenses may be granted by or through such officers or agencies as the Secretary of the Treasury may designate, and the decision of the Secretary with respect to the granting, denial or other disposition of an application or license shall be final.” — Section 7, Title 12 U.S.C. Banks and Banking

Do the issues I have brought up sound like this is a Constitutional government to you? I have not covered the main nexus, the money. I didn’t make up this information; it is the government’s own documents and legal definitions taken from their dictionaries. I wish the hard working Americans in the government that are loyal to an American Republic could read this, the more that know the truth the better.

In Which Court Do You Practice Law?

It is very important to appreciate the fact that District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are NOT the same as the United States District Courts (“USDC”). The District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are constitutional judicial courts that originate in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are territorial tribunals that originate in

Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (also known as the Territory Clause); OR legislative (administrative) courts, that originate in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.

 Paul Mitchell’s opening brief to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on behalf of the Gilbertson in

USA v. Gilbertson in District Courts of the United States, DCUS – Minneapolis #4-96-65” cites numerous court cases that have already clarified the all important distinction between these two classes of federal district courts. Mitchell’s opening brief in

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Appeal No. 02-15269 (especially in section 7d -7f) was even more extensive in scope.

Mitchell cites, for example, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1922), the high Court held that the USDC belongs in the federal Territories only; not in the states. Thus the USDC, as such, appear to lack any lawful authorities to prosecute income tax crimes. The USDC are legislative tribunals where summary proceedings dominate.

For example, under the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 1292, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC.

foreign municipal corporation domiciled in Washington, D.C. called the “United States”

“… the United States is to be regarded as a body politic and corporate. … It is suggested that the United States is to be regarded as a domestic corporation, so far as the State of New York is concerned. We think this contention has no support in reason or authority. … The United States is a foreign corporation in relation to a State.” in re Merriam’s Estate, 36 NE 505, 506 22.

The Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was never expressly abolished inside the several States by any Act(s) of Congress, or by any rule changes:

 The Act of June 25, 1948, expressly changed the name of the “District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia” to “United States District Court for the District of Columbia”, but only in the District of Columbia [underlines and bold added]. See § 32(b) in said Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 985 to 991.

However, no such comprehensive amendments were ever enacted for statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS located within the several States of the Union.

  • 39 of the Act of June 25, 1948, contained an explicit “Schedule of Laws Repealed,” and the legislative history of this Act is equally explicit:

This method of specific repeal will relieve the courts of the burdensome task of ferreting out implied repeals.

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 709]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

In this bill we have set up a new section of the billlisting chronologically all of the laws which we repeal.

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 731]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

The statute at 28 U.S.C. 132 likewise did not abolish the Article III DCUS inside the several States. See 62 Stat. 895. For example, compare the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39; the Sherman Act; and the Securities and Exchange Acts.

The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, was likewise never repealed by

28 U.S.C. 132 or otherwise. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121 (still uncodified).

In effect, 28 U.S.C. 132 appears to have broadcasted an extra legislative tribunal from the federal Territories into the several States of the Union, but without expressly abolishing the constitutional

Article III DCUS inside those States.

 FROM: Opening Brief by Plaintiff Paul Mitchell in Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Appeal No. 02-15269

7(d)      The abrogation clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) cannot retroactively amend federal statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”):

 This honorable Court of Appeals will please take formal judicial Notice of Appellant’s proper and timely challenge now filed in this appeal against 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the ex post facto prohibition.

See legislative history of 1988 amendments, Rep. Kastenmeier: “unwise and potentially unconstitutional”.

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “separation of powers” as follows:

… [A] power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency.

[Williams v. United States]

[289 U.S. 553, 580 (1933)]

However, the high Court in that case erred by defining “Party” in Article III to mean Plaintiff only. This definition contradicts the definition of “Party” as found in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) (“Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants).

Accordingly, an FRCP amendment effective October 20, 1949, was strictly limited to those rules and could never have altered any existing federal statutes, whether retroactively or otherwise. See further discussion at 7(e) infra.

In particular, see Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 58 S.Ct. 543, 82 L.Ed. 748 (1938) (term “District Courts of the United States” in its historic and proper sense); Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 985 to 991, § 2(b) (“continuations of existing law”) and § 9 (“the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States”).

7(e)      The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., is vague and deceptive in several of its key provisions and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

By way of introduction, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the instant case, nor do any of the courts situated in any of the federal Territories or Possessions.

California is neither a United States Territory acquired under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”), nor is it an enclave acquired under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 (“1:8:17”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (“U.S. Constitution”).

It is clear from the original Statute at Large quoted above (60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39) that the DCUS is the only federal court with original jurisdiction competent to hear claims arising under the Lanham Act, when the venue is a judicial district of California (or any other State of the Union, for that matter). See 28 U.S.C. 84(b).

The DCUS and the USDC are decidedly not one and the same.

Appellant now supplies further conclusive proof.

The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., contains provisions deliberately written and implemented to foster the false and misleading conclusion that ‑‑ in all matters arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States ‑‑ these two courts are synonymous and identical in all respects whatsoever. See Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) and the Supremacy Clause in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331.

Appellant honestly trembles at the mere thought of challenging a comprehensive revision, codification, and enactment of all laws that have governed the conduct of the federal courts in this great nation for 54 years.

However, a careful review of the relevant evidence, as found in various sections of Title 28, U.S.C., has rendered that challenge necessary and inevitable.

That careful review now follows:

It is now abundantly evident to Appellant, and Appellant hereby offers to prove, that:

(1)        the Article III DCUS inside the several States were never expressly abolished by Congress;

(2)        Congress knows how to abolish federal courts when it intends to do so; and,

(3)        the Act of June 25, 1948, attempted fraudulently to conceal the DCUS, and to create the false impressions that they had been re‑defined as, replaced by, and/or rendered synonymous with, the USDC.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 132, 451, 610.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are decidedly not favored. See U.S. v. United Continental Tuna, 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976), for example.

As of this writing, Appellant has assembled an exhaustive list of all statutes in Title 28 that expressly mention either the USDC, the DCUS, or both. For the convenience and edification of all, Appellant now advises this honorable Court, and all interested parties, that the results of this research have been published at Internet URL’s:

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/dcus.in.28usc.bold.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/usdc.in.28usc.bold.htm

In any Act of Congress, words importing the plural include the singular, and words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things. See 1 U.S.C. 1.

Therefore, the rules of statutory construction strictly bar intermingling of “United States District Courts” with “District Courts of the United States”. Confer also at “Noscitur a sociis” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

On the other hand, the term “district courts” [sic] does embrace both the DCUS and the USDC, since there appears to be a hierarchical relationship between this term and the courts constituted by Chapter 5 of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. 451.

This Court is respectfully requested to recognize, and to take formal judicial notice, that the ex post facto restriction in the U.S. Constitution (“1:9:3”) emphatically bars Congress from retroactively re-defining the meaning of “district courts of the United States” as that term was used in all federal legislation prior to June 25, 1948 A.D. See, in particular, the Lanham Act at

60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39; other examples abound.

Appellant’s Immunity from ex post facto legislation is a fundamental Right. See the Privileges and Immunities Clause

(“4:2:1”). Federal copyright and trademark laws protect Appellant’s Rights uniformly in every State of the Union.

7(f)       The Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was never expressly abolished inside the several States by any Act(s) of Congress, or by any rule changes:

 The Act of June 25, 1948, expressly changed the name of the “District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia” to “United States District Court for the District of Columbia”, but only in the District of Columbia [underlines and bold added]. See § 32(b) in said Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 985 to 991.

However, no such comprehensive amendments were ever enacted for statutes conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS located within the several States of the Union.

  • 39 of the Act of June 25, 1948, contained an explicit “Schedule of Laws Repealed,” and the legislative history of this Act is equally explicit:

This method of specific repeal will relieve the courts of the burdensome task of ferreting out implied repeals.

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 709]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

In this bill we have set up a new section of the billlisting chronologically all of the laws which we repeal.

[“Revision of Title 28, United States Code”]

[House Report No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Session]

[28 USCA 2461 to End, page 731]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

The statute at 28 U.S.C. 132 likewise did not abolish the Article III DCUS inside the several States. See 62 Stat. 895. For example, compare the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39; the Sherman Act; and the Securities and Exchange Acts.

The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, was likewise never repealed by

28 U.S.C. 132 or otherwise. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121 (still uncodified).

In effect, 28 U.S.C. 132 appears to have broadcasted an extra legislative tribunal from the federal Territories into the several States of the Union, but without expressly abolishing the constitutional Article III DCUS inside those States.

For example, see all predecessor statutes of 28 U.S.C. 132 for its territorial origins, i.e. § 641 of Title 48, U.S.C, 1940 ed., Territories and Insular Possessions.

Think of it as a clear plastic overlay.

Also, see further discussion on this crucial point in

AUTHOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTESTING DECLARATION OF WESLEY C.J. EHLERS, Page 6 of 10, lines 3‑27 inclusive (Docket #164), concluding:

Plaintiff has carefully reviewed the history of amendments to this latter statute [60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39], and believes He is legally correct to conclude that the federal court with original jurisdiction of Lanham Act claims has remained unchanged in California and is still the constitutional Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), and not the legislative

Article IV United States District Court (“USDC”).

A rules amendment effective December 29, 1948, amended the title “Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States” to read “Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts” [underlines and bold added].

And, a rules amendment effective October 20, 1949, substituted the words “United States district courts” for the words “district courts of the United States” throughout the FRCP.

However, the exact scope of these substitutions was limited to the FRCP and could not have affected any federal statutes. See Notes to FRCP Rule 1.

The Lanham Act statute at 60 Stat. 440, Sec. 39, conferring original jurisdiction on the DCUS, was likewise unaffected by these rule changes, and could not have been affected by these rule changes, notwithstanding the abrogation clause supra.

Moreover, repeals by implication are decidedly not favored by the courts. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987); 74 Am.Jur.2d 21-22 citing Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907) and U.S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213

(1902); Jackson v. Stinnett supra, 102 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 1996); also “Separation of Powers and Delegation of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act,” by Leslie M. Kelleher, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, Feb. 2000.

7(g)      In the opinions of recognized constitutional scholars, such as Justice Story, the Congress has affirmative obligations to create and to maintain constitutional district courts, proceeding in judicial mode.

The reasons for this proposition are simple, if not immediately obvious:

The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is quite limited under Article III, as compared to its appellate jurisdiction unde

r Article III.

The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III embraces matters that arise under the

Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States). See also the Arising Under Clause at

3:2:1 in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. 1331 supra.

Cases that arise under the Supremacy Clause, as mirrored by 3:2:1 and by 28 U.S.C. 1331, would need to originate first in an inferior constitutional court, before those cases could ever reach the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal.

The exact same argument can be extended to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction: specifically, civil litigation under the Lanham Act must first originate in an inferior constitutional court, before such a case could ever reach the Ninth Circuit on appeal! In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit must proceed in constitutional mode.

The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that Congress must first create constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode, and then it must also perpetuate them, in order to satisfy Article III and the

Fifth Amendment.

To do otherwise would constitute a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment, which mandates due process of law (among other things). This mandate is also embodied in numerous provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a United States treaty rendered supreme Law by the Supremacy Clause. See Article 14 in that Covenant, for example.

The entire thrust of that Covenant is to guarantee independent, impartial and qualified judicial officers presiding upon courts of competent jurisdiction (and not Star Chambers, or other tribunals where summary proceedings are the norm, and where due process is not a fundamental Right (read “shall”) but a privilege granted at the discretion of those tribunals (read “may”)).

In pari materia, compare the language in Rules 201(c) and 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FREv”): the former is discretionary (“may”); the latter is mandatory (“shall”). Confer at “Fundamental right” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (analogous to “shall”).

(Incidentally, Appellant is protesting the Seventh Edition of Black’s, because it has conspicuously omitted any definition of the term “United States” ‑‑ a term which figures prominently throughout federal laws and throughout the U.S. Constitution!)

7(h)      Appellant therefore asserts a fundamental Right to due process of law, which necessarily mandates courts of competent jurisdiction in the first instance. Within the 50 States of the Union, these are the DCUS and only the DCUS.

The District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) are constitutional courts vested by law with competent jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States.

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts must be strictly construed [cites 5(c) supra].

Appellant argues that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed as well.

See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) in the context of interlocutory orders.

Inside the several States of the Union, the United States District Courts (“USDC”) are not constitutional courts vested by law with original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Lanham Act. Confer at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Sixth.

Inside the several States of the Union, the courts vested by law with competent, original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies that arise under the Lanham Act are the DCUS.

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to these courts have used language and terminology that enjoy a well established historic meaning. See Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (the term DCUS in its historic and proper sense). Confer at “Noscitur a sociis” in Black’s Sixth.

Within California State, therefore, the DCUS is the only federal court with competent jurisdiction to originate the instant case.

7(i)       Federal municipal law cannot be usurped to switch the instant proceedings from constitutional mode to legislative mode.

The 50 States of the Union are not “United States Districts” [sic]; they are judicial districts! Federal municipal law does not operate, of its own force, inside those judicial districts. See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 (the federal zone).

Even though the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are likewise judicial districts, federal municipal law can operate there because neither is a Union State. 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 119.

Nevertheless, federal municipal law is likewise bound by all pertinent restrictions in the U.S. Constitution, because the U.S. Constitution was expressly extended into D.C. in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively (hereinafter “extension statutes”).

In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled:

 “It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and even predates it.”  Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)

“A practice condemned by the Constitution cannot be saved by historical acceptance and present convenience.” U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1338] [(9th Cir. 1984)

Appellant alleges that the nomenclature “United States District” [sic], as found on the caption pages of all federal court orders today, is now being used to trigger legislative mode without adequate notice to litigants, in violation of the

Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments (read “fraud”).

This dubious mechanism is called “silent judicial notice” [sic] ‑‑ surely a misnomer, if ever there was one. It would be entirely more accurate to call it “silent legislative notice”, since this practice is a deceptive device now rampant within legislative courts, and the DCUS are currently vacant.

But, has Congress been silent, or merely vague?

7(j)       The extension statutes are monumentally important, in light of highly successful efforts by the federal government, since the year 1866 A.D., to create an absolute legislative democracy within the several States of the Union.

The Guarantee Clause does not require the United States to guarantee a Republic Form of government to itself, but only to the 50 States.

Strictly speaking, Congress was free to create such a democracy, but only within the federal zone, and not within the State zone. See 1:8:17 and 4:3:2. The territorial reach of such a democracy is necessarily limited to the federal zone, and not beyond. See also the 1866 Civil Rights Act (an early example of federal municipal law) and IRC 3121(e).

Legally speaking, the population of federal citizens now “residing” within the several States of the Union is an absolute legislative democracy, by Congressional intent. Confer at “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Sixth.

Federal citizenship is a municipal franchise domiciled in the District of Columbia. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45

(1885). In this context, the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is correctly understood to mean “subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress”.

The U.S. Supreme Court has acquiesced to this questionable legislative intent. Under the Downes Doctrine, the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States that are united by, and under, it. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Harlan dissenting. This Doctrine is demonstrably specious, because it is contrary to Law.

Another deceptive device, perhaps?

The Downes Doctrine was later extended in the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court ruled that the guaranties [sic] of the U.S. Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guaranties applicable ‑‑ by enacting federal statutes. Under this Doctrine, the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution would not extend into the federal zone without specific legislative action.

This latter presumption is conclusively rebutted by the extension statutes, however. Clearly, all guarantees in the U.S. Constitution have already been expressly extended into D.C. and into all federal Territories, without exception, effectively destroying the Downes Doctrine 30 years before the fact.

Ignorance of the Law is no excuse for violating the Law.

It would only compound the ubiquitous errors that have already been made under the Downes Doctrine to treat the States of the Union as federal Territories in any manner whatsoever, least of all by convening territorial courts inside those States.

In this context, therefore, legislative tribunals like the USDC are entirely out of place, and wholly lacking jurisdiction, to entertain any cases that arise under the Lanham Act when States of the Union are the “judicial districts” where the violations are alleged to have occurred.

For now, California is a judicial district, not a legislative district, and original jurisdiction over such cases is clearly vested in courts specifically created to exercise the judicial Power of the United States.

This latter phrase is controlling, because it introduces Article III and forms the basis for all Clauses that Article contains.

Accordingly, for all of the substantive reasons stated above, the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) still remain the only federal courts with original jurisdiction legally competent to hear cases arising under the Lanham Act, when violations of that Act are alleged to have occurred inside States of the Union and across State lines.

7(k)      Vagueness, once fully documented wherever it occurs, will be shown to conflict directly with the stated legislative intent of the Act of June 25, 1948.

The stated legislative intent of that Act is clear enough: “The provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United States Code, set out in section 1 of this Act, … shall be construed as continuations of existing law …” [bold emphasis added].

Moreover, “No loss of rights, interruption of jurisdiction, or prejudice to matters pending in any of such courts on the effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.” [bold emphasis added]

See Miscellaneous Provisions, Act of June 25, 1948, C. 646, §§ 2 to 39, 62 Stat. 985 to 991, as amended.

In good faith, Appellant constructs these Miscellaneous Provisions to read: “No loss of Rights and no interruption of jurisdiction shall result from its enactment.”

What, then, is meant by the term “existing law”?

If Congress had intended to abolish the DCUS, they would (and they should) have said so. The period between 1789 A.D. and 1948 A.D. spans 159 years of judicial history! Hiding a herd of elephants under a rug would be easier than hiding the DCUS under a pretense.

To reiterate these all important points: Statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Repeals by implication (or magic carpets) are decidedly not favored. The law of jurisdiction is fundamental law. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law; without it, courts cannot proceed at all in any cause. Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., __ U.S. __ (1999), No. 98‑470, May 17, 1999 A.D.

In 1946 A.D., two years before the Act of June 25, 1948, the Lanham Act conferred original jurisdiction on the several DCUS. These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. Inside the several States of the Union, the DCUS are the only federal courts with original jurisdiction to hear cases that arise under the Lanham Act.

This is the existing law!

The USDC are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (the USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III!); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.

Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464

(1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516

(1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50

(1982).

To the extent that the Act of June 25, 1948, was written and enacted to justify or otherwise foster the notion that all violations of Congressional acts predating that year can now be prosecuted in the USDC ‑‑ a legislative court that was broadcasted from the federal Territories into the several (48) States on that date ‑‑ then that Act is demonstrably unconstitutional for at least four reasons:

(1)        it exhibits vagueness on this obviously important point;

 (2)        it violates the ex post facto prohibition;

 (3)        it violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and elsewhere; and,

 (4)           it violates the well established principle that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed.

Prof. Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst, on the faculty of the UCLA Law School, summed it up nicely as follows:

In essence a legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name. While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of that business would work a fundamental change in the status of our independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.

[Discussion of “Legislative Court”]

[in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution]

[New York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986)]

[underlines and bold emphasis added]

7(l)       There are essential facts in this case which were either too subtle, or too voluminous, for the Magistrate and Judge Shubb to appreciate fully; neither has read and understood the whole docket file. Appellant now highlights these essential facts, to ensure that they are not also overlooked by this honorable Court:

(1)        On August 2, 1998 A.D., certain Defendants defaulted in response to Appellant’s DEMANDS FOR AUTHORIZATION (Exhibit “K”), thus satisfying the 3-year statute of limitations in the Copyright Act. Others defaulted after that date.

(2)        The acts of removing Appellant’s README file, containing His SHAREWARE POLICY, were acts of fraudulent concealment (“active misconduct”) and false designation of origin that resulted in tolling all pertinent statutes of limitation.

(3)        Withholding the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Appellant’s exclusive copyrights was also an act of fraudulent concealment, making it impossible for the district court to assess actual damages. See Exhibit “J”.

(4)        Withholding the computer activity logs of ISP’s, in response to valid SUBPOENA’s issued under

17 U.S.C. 512(h), was tantamount to further fraudulent concealment and probable cause for contempt of court, and sanctions.

(5)        Counterfeits of the subject book remain on the Internet to this day, e.g. at Internet domain 9X.TC, proving conclusively that the threat of continuing wrong is substantial, premeditated and malicious. See Taylor supra.

(6)           Further retaliations against Appellant, e.g. denial of service attacks on Appellant’s website, physical assault and breach of the contract to serve SUMMONSES, justify immediate relief in the form of preliminary injunctions during pendency of this action

(see RELIEF REQUESTED in the Initial COMPLAINT).

(7)        Appellant’s primary emphasis in preparing the Initial COMPLAINT was to organize the electronic evidence, to preserve it intact, and to make it readily accessible via the Internet and its most popular search engines, e.g. the View | Source option in Microsoft Internet Explorer.

(8)        Printing hard copies of electronic evidence, particularly files coded in HTML, results in hiding the underlying markup codes where crucial evidence of hyperlinks and associated domains is to be found.

(9)        Appellant’s hard copy files contain many additional documents which Appellant has not had time to enter and which should be entered into evidence in the district court, e.g. the written amnesty offers that were mailed to certain suspects in the summer of 1999 A.D.

(10)      The Lanham Act was enacted expressly to enforce treaties like the Declaration and the

Covenant: “The intent of this chapter is … to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.”

See 15 U.S.C. 1127, last paragraph (uncodified).

(11)      Appellant’s Common Law Rights are expressly reserved by the Seventh and Tenth Amendments, the terms of which Congress is barred from re-defining. Thus, to suggest that Congress has abolished common law copyrights necessarily results in infringing Rights guaranteed by those Amendments, in this case. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

(12)      To refer to any of the issues discussed above as “frivolous” is an obnoxious insult to Appellant. Matters that arise under the Supremacy Clause are never frivolous. Why would State and federal laws impose solemn oaths of office on all public officials, if the State and Federal Constitutions were frivolous? Reductio ad absurdum.

Do you have any other cases pending in this court? If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

Answer: No

Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court? If so, give the name and docket number of each case.

Answer: No

For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing your complaint in the district court?

Answer: (not applicable in this civil case)

The 4 United States: Which One Are We Talking About?

 Are you a Citizen, a National, a Resident Alien, or Non-Resident Alien

“United States” as a private corporation – 1871 — UScorp

(1)     United States* or U.S.* (first meaning)

  The name of the sovereign Nation, occupying the position of other sovereigns in the family of nations.

 (2)     United States** or U.S.** (second meaning)

  The federal government and the limited territory over which it exercises exclusive sovereign authority.

 (3)United States-Corp or US-Corp as a private corporation – 1871 — UScorp

 

(4)     United States*** or U.S.***

The collective name for the States united by and under the Constitution for the United States of America.

28 U.S.C. 1603(a)(3) states as follows:

(3)        which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title ….

Section 1332(d). The word “States”, as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

 Examples of Two Definitions

of the term “United States” in 26 U.S.C.

 First Definition

 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9):

(9)        United States. — The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

Second Definition

 26 U.S.C. 4612(a)(4)(A):

In general. — The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

[emphasis added]

The Supreme Court stated in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellsey, 6 U.S. 445, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed 332, that the District of Columbia is not a “State” within the meaning of the Constitution. Therefore, it is apparent that the meaning of the term “States” in the first definition above can only mean the territories and possessions belonging to the “United States”, because of the specific mention of the District of Columbia and the specific absence of the 50 States (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius). The District of Columbia is not a “State” within the meaning of the Constitution (see Hepburn supra). Therefore, the 50 States are specifically excluded from this first definition of the term “United States”.

Congress has no problem naming the “50 States” when it is legislating for them, so, in the second definition of the term “United States” above, Congress expressly mentions them, and there is no misunderstanding. If a statute in 26 U.S.C. does not have a special “word of art” definition for the term “United States”, then the First Definition of the term “United States” is always used (see above) because of the general nature of that term as defined by Congress.

When citizens or residents of the first “United States” are without the geographical area of this first “United States”, their “compensation for personal services actually rendered” is defined as “foreign earned income” in 26 U.S.C., Section 911(b) and 911(d)(2), as follows:

911(b) Foreign Earned Income. — …

(d)(2) Earned Income. —

(A)       In general. — The term “earned income” means wages, salaries, or professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually rendered, but does not include that part of the compensation derived by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which represents a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services actually rendered.

A citizen or resident of the first “United States” does not pay a tax on his “compensation for personal services actually rendered” while residing outside of the first “United States”, because Congress has exempted all such compensation from taxation under 26 U.S.C., Section 911(a)(1), which reads as follows:

911(a) Exclusion from Gross Income. — … [T]here shall be excluded from the gross income of such individual, and exempt from taxation … (1) the foreign earned income of such individual ….

When residing without (outside) this “United States”, the citizen or resident of this “United States” pays no tax on “foreign earned income”, but is required to file a return, claiming the exemption (see IRS Form 2555).

26 C.F.R., Section 871-13(c) allows this citizen to abandon his citizenship or residence in the “United States” by residing elsewhere.

26 C.F.R., Section 1.911-2(g) defines the term “United States” as follows:

United States. The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of the United States. It includes the states4, [Puerto Rico, Guam, Mariana Islands, etc.] the District of Columbia, the possessions and territories of the United States, the territorial waters of the United States, the air space over the United States, and the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas which are adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States and over which the United States has exclusive rights, in accordance with international law ….

None of the 50 united States comes under the sovereignty of the “United States”, and subsection (h) defines the 50 States united by the Constitution as “foreign countries”:

Foreign country. The term “foreign country” when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of a government other than that of the United States.

[26 C.F.R. 1.911-2(h)]

All of the 50 States are foreign with respect to each other and are under the sovereignty of their respective Legislatures, except where a power has been expressly delegated to Congress. The Citizens of each Union State are foreigners and aliens with respect to another Union State, unless they establish a residence therein under the laws of that Union State. Otherwise, they are nonresident aliens with respect to all the other Union States.

The regulations at 26 C.F.R., Section 1.1-1(a) state, in pertinent part:

General Rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by Section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien individual.

26 U.S.C., Section 1 imposes a tax on “taxable income” as follows, in pertinent part:

There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of … every married individual … who makes a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013 ….

The regulations promulgated to explain 26 U.S.C., Section 1 are found in 26 C.F.R., Section 1.1-1, and state in pertinent part:

General Rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by Section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien individual.

And, for declarations made under the penalties of perjury, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 1746 separately defines declarations made WITHIN and WITHOUT the “United States” as follows:

If executed WITHOUT the United States: I declare … under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.”

“If executed WITHIN the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: I declare … that the foregoing is true and correct.”

A democracy that recognizes only manmade laws perforce obliterates the concept of Liberty as a divine right. A Ticket to Liberty, by Lori Jacques, November 1990 edition, page 146

[emphasis added]

In the constitutional Republic, however, the rights of individuals are supreme. Individuals delegate their sovereignty to a written contract, called a constitution, which empowers government to hire public servants to write laws primarily for the benefit of individuals. The corporations occupy the lowest priority in this chain of command, since their primary objectives are to maximize the enjoyment of individual rights, and to facilitate the fulfillment of individual responsibilities. The enforcement of laws within this scheme is the responsibility of sovereign individuals, who exercise their power in three arenas: the voting booth, the trial jury, and the grand jury. Without a jury verdict of “guilty”, for example, no law can be enforced and no penalty exacted. The behavior of public servants is tightly restrained by contractual terms, as found in the written U.S. Constitution. Statutes and case law are created primarily to limit and define the scope and extent of public servant power.

Sovereign individuals are subject only to a Common Law, whose primary purposes are to protect and defend individual rights, and to prevent anyone, whether public official or private person, from violating the rights of other individuals. Within this scheme, Sovereigns are never subject to their own creations, and the constitutional contract is such a creation. To quote the Supreme Court, “No fiction can make a natural born subject.” Milvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. 598 (1808). That is to say, no fiction, be it a corporation, a statute law, or an administrative regulation, can mutate a natural born Sovereign into someone who is subject to his own creations. Author and scholar Lori Jacques has put it succinctly as follows:

As each state is sovereign and not a territory of the United States**, the meaning is clear that state citizens are not subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the United States**. Furthermore, there is not the slightest intimation in the Constitution which created the “United States” as a political entity that the “United States” is sovereign over its creators.

A Ticket to Liberty by Lori Jacques, Nov. 1990, p. 32]

Accordingly, if you choose to investigate the matter, you will find a very large body of legal literature which cites another fiction, the so-called 14th Amendment, from which the federal government presumes to derive general authority to treat everyone in America as subjects and not as Sovereigns:

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States**, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States** and of the State wherein they reside.

[United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [sic]]

[emphasis added]

A careful reading of this amendment reveals an important subtlety which is lost on many people who read it for the first time. The citizens it defines are second class citizens because the “c” is lower-case, even in the case of the State citizens it defines. Note how the amendment defines “citizens of the United States**” and “citizens of the State wherein they reside”! It is just uncanny how the wording of this amendment closely parallels the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) which promulgates Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). Can it be that this amendment had something to do with subjugation, by way of taxes and other means? Yes, it most certainly did. IRC section 1 is the section which imposes income taxes. The corresponding section of the CFR defines who is a “citizen” as follows:

Every person born or naturalized in the United States** and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.

[26 CFR 1.1-1(c), emphasis added]

Notice the use of the term “its jurisdiction”. This leaves no doubt that the “United States**” is a singular entity in this context. In other words, it is the federal zone. Do we dare to speculate why the so-called 14th Amendment was written instead with the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof“? Is this another case of deliberate ambiguity? You be the judge.

Not only did this so-called “amendment” fail to specify which meaning of the term “United States” was being used; like the 16th Amendment, it also failed to be ratified, this time by 15 of the 37 States which existed in 1868. The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the documentation you need to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law (see page 15,641 et seq.). For example, it itemizes all States which voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their Legislatures did so. “I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted.” State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 941 (1975). The Utah Supreme Court has detailed the shocking and sordid history of the 14th Amendment’s “adoption” in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968).

A great deal of written material on the 14th Amendment has been assembled into computer files by Richard McDonald, whose mailing address is 585-D Box Canyon Road, Canoga Park, California Republic (not “CA”). He requests that ZIP codes not be used on his incoming mail (use the foreign address format found in USPS Publication 221 instead).

Richard McDonald has done a mountain of legal research and writing on the origins and effects of the so-called 14th Amendment. He documents how key court decisions like the Slaughter House Cases, among many others, all found that there is a clear distinction between a Citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States** . A State Citizen is a Sovereign, whereas a citizen of the United States** is a subject of Congress.

The exercise of federal citizenship is a statutory privilege which can be taxed with excises. The exercise of State Citizenship is a Common Law Right which simply cannot be taxed, because governments cannot tax the exercise of a right, ever.

The case of U.S. v. Cruikshank is famous, not only for confirming this distinction between State Citizens and federal citizens, but also for establishing a key precedent in the area of due process. This precedent underlies the “void for vagueness” doctrine which can and should be applied to nullify the IRC. On the issue of citizenship, the Cruikshank court ruled as follows:

We have in our political system a government of the United States** and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States** and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those he has under the other. Slaughter-House Cases

 [United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)]

[emphasis added]

The leading authorities for this pivotal distinction are, indeed, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions known as the Slaughter House Cases, which examined the so-called 14th Amendment in depth. An exemplary paragraph from these cases is the following:

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States** and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

[Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36]

[21 L.Ed. 394 (1873)]

[emphasis added]

 

A similar authority is found in the case of K. Tashiro v. Jordan, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of California almost fifty years later. Notice, in particular, how the California Supreme Court again cites the Slaughter House Cases:

That there is a citizenship of the United States** and a citizenship of a state, and the privileges and immunities of one are not the same as the other is well established by the decisions of the courts of this country. The leading cases upon the subjects are those decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and reported in 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394, and known as the Slaughter House Cases.

[K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 256 P. 545, 549 (1927)]

[affirmed 278 U.S. 123 (1928)]

[emphasis added]

The Slaughter House Cases are quite important to the issue of citizenship, but the pivotal case on the subject is the famous Dred Scott decision, decided in 1856, prior to the Civil War. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote one of the longest decisions in the entire history of American jurisprudence. In arriving at their understanding of the precise meaning of Citizenship, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, the high Court left no stone unturned in their search for relevant law:

We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain words of the Constitution itself: we have the legislation of the different States, before, about the time, and since the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period; and we have the constant and uniform action of the Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same result. And if anything in relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now give to the word “citizen” and the word “people.”

 [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856)]

[emphasis added]

In the fundamental law, the notion of a “citizen of the United States” simply did not exist before the 14th Amendment; at best, this notion is a fiction within a fiction. In discussing the power of the States to naturalize, the California Supreme Court put it rather bluntly when it ruled that there was no such thing as a “citizen of the United States”:

A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in the Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other provisions. The object then to be attained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective States.

 [Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)]

[emphasis added]

This decision has never been overturned!

What is the proper construction and common understanding of the term “Citizen of the United States” as used in the original U.S. Constitution, before the so-called 14th Amendment? This is an important question, because this status is still a qualification for the federal offices of Senator, Representative and President.

No Person can be a Representative unless he has been a Citizen of the United States for seven years (1:2:2); no Person can be a Senator unless he has been a Citizen of the United States for nine years (1:3:3); no Person can be President unless he is a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States (2:1:5).

If these requirements had been literally obeyed, there could have been no elections for Representatives to Congress for at least seven years after the adoption of the Constitution, and no one would have been eligible to be a Senator for nine years after its adoption.

Author John S. Wise, in a rare book now available on Richard McDonald’s electronic bulletin board system (“BBS”), explains away the problem very simply as follows:

The language employed by the convention was less careful than that which had been used by Congress in July of the same year, in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory. Congress had made the qualification rest upon citizenship of “one of the United States***,” and this is doubtless the intent of the convention which framed the Constitution, for it cannot have meant anything else.

 [Studies in Constitutional Law:]

[A Treatise on American Citizenship]

[by John S. Wise, Edward Thompson Co. (1906)]

[emphasis added]

This quote from the Northwest Ordinance is faithful to the letter and to the spirit of that law. In describing the eligibility for “representatives” to serve in the general assembly for the Northwest Territory, the critical passage from that Ordinance reads as follows:

… Provided, That no person be eligible or qualified to act as a representative, unless he shall have been a citizen of one of the United States*** three years, and be a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years; ….

[Northwest Ordinance, Section 9, July 13, 1787]

[The Confederate Congress]

[emphasis added]

Without citing the case as such, the words of author John S. Wise sound a close, if not identical parallel to the argument for the Respondent filed in the case of People v. De La Guerra, decided by the California Supreme Court in 1870. The following long passage elaborates the true meaning of the Constitutional qualifications for the federal offices of President and Representative:

As it was the adoption of the Constitution by the Conventions of nine States that established and created the United States***, it is obvious there could not then have existed any person who had been seven years a citizen of the United States***, or who possessed the Presidential qualifications of being thirty-five years of age, a natural born citizen, and fourteen years a resident of the United States***. The United States*** in these provisions, means the States united. To be twenty-five years of age, and for seven years to have been a citizen of one of the States which ratifies the Constitution, is the qualification of a representative. To be a natural born citizen of one of the States which shall ratify the Constitution, or to be a citizen of one of said States at the time of such ratification, and to have attained the age of thirty-five years, and to have been fourteen years a resident within one of the said States, are the Presidential qualifications, according to the true meaning of the Constitution.

[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870)]

[emphasis added]

Indeed, this was the same exact understanding that was reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott. There, the high Court clearly reinforced the sovereign status of Citizens of the several States. The sovereigns are the Union State Citizens, i.e. the Citizens of the States United:

It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges guarantied [sic] to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several state communities, or who should afterwards, by birthright or otherwise, become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.

[Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404 (1856)]

[emphasis added]

Thus, the phrase “Citizen of the United States” as found in the original Constitution is synonymous with the phrase “Citizen of one of the United States***”, i.e., a Union State Citizen. This simple explanation will help to cut through the mountain of propaganda and deception which have been foisted on all Americans by government bureaucrats and their high-paid lawyers. Federal citizens were not even contemplated as such when the organic U.S. Constitution was first drafted. For authority, see the case of Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914-915 (1918), as quoted in the Preface.

With this understanding firmly in place, it is very revealing to discover that many reprints of the Constitution now utilize a lower-case “c” in the clauses which describe the qualifications for the offices of Senator, Representative and President. This is definitely wrong, and it is probably deliberate, so as to confuse everyone into equating Citizens of the United States with citizens of the United States, courtesy of the so-called 14th Amendment. This is another crucial facet of the federal tax fraud.

There is a very big difference between the two statuses, not the least of which is the big difference in their respective liabilities for the income tax.

 Moreover, it is quite clear that one may be a State Citizen without also being a “citizen of the United States”, whether or not the 14th Amendment was properly ratified! According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the highest exercise of a State’s sovereignty is the right to declare who are its own Citizens:

A person who is a citizen of the United States** is necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States**. To hold otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty, — the right to declare who are its citizens.

[State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)]

[emphasis added]

This right is reserved to each of the 50 States by the Tenth Amendment.

In a book to which this writer has returned time and time again, author Alan Stang faithfully recites some of the other relevant court authorities, all of which ultimately trace back to the Slaughter House Cases and the Dred Scott decision:

Indeed, just as one may be a “citizen of the United States” and not a citizen of a State; so one apparently may be a citizen of a State but not of the United States. On July 21, 1966, the Court of Appeal of Maryland ruled in Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431; a headnote in which tells us: “Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state ….” At page 434, Judge Oppenheimer cites a Wisconsin ruling in which the court said this: “Under our complex system of government, there may be a citizen of a state, who is not a citizen of the United States in the full sense of the term

[Tax Scam, 1988 edition, pages 138-139]

[emphasis added]

Conversely, there may be a citizen of the United States** who is not a Citizen of any one of the 50 States. In People v. De La Guerra quoted above, the published decision of the California Supreme Court clearly maintained this crucial distinction between the two classes of citizenship, and did so only two years after the alleged ratification of the so‑called 14th Amendment:

[Please see next page.]

I have no doubt that those born in the Territories, or in the District of Columbia, are so far citizens as to entitle them to the protection guaranteed to citizens of the United States** in the Constitution, and to the shield of nationality abroad; but it is evident that they have not the political rights which are vested in citizens of the States. They are not constituents of any community in which is vested any sovereign power of government. Their position partakes more of the character of subjects than of citizens. They are subject to the laws of the United States**, but have no voice in its management. If they are allowed to make laws, the validity of these laws is derived from the sanction of a Government in which they are not represented. Mere citizenship they may have, but the political rights of citizens they cannot enjoy until they are organized into a State, and admitted into the Union.

[People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 342 (1870)]

[emphasis added]

Using language that was much more succinct, author Luella Gettys, Ph.D. and “Sometime Carnegie Fellow in International Law” at the University of Chicago, explained it quite nicely this way:

… [A]s long as the territories are not admitted to statehood no state citizenship therein could exist.

[The Law of Citizenship in the United States]

[Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 7]

This clear distinction between the Union States and the territories is endorsed officially by the U.S. Supreme Court. Using language very similar to that of the California Supreme Court in the De La Guerra case, the high Court explained the distinction this way in the year 1885, seventeen years after the adoption of the so-called 14th amendment:

The people of the United States***, as sovereign owners of the national territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. … The personal and civil rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured to them, as to other citizens, by the principles of constitutional liberty, which restrain all the agencies of government, state and national; their political rights are franchises which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion of the congress of the United States**. This doctrine was fully and forcibly declared by the chief justice, delivering the opinion of the court in National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129.  

[Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)]

[italics in original, emphasis added]

The political rights of the federal zone’s citizens are “franchises” which they hold as “privileges” at the discretion of the Congress of the United States**. Indeed, the doctrine declared earlier in the National Bank case leaves no doubt that Congress is the municipal authority for the territories:

All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States* not included in any State must, necessarily, be governed by or under the authority of Congress. The Territories are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States**. They bear much the same relation to the General Government that counties do to the States, and Congress may legislate for them as States do for their respective municipal organizations. The organic law of a Territory takes the place of a constitution, as the fundamental law of the local government. It is obligatory on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is supreme and, for the purposes of this department of its governmental authority, has all the powers of the People of the United States***, except such as have been expressly or by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitution.

[First National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1880)]

[emphasis added]

This knowledge can be extremely valuable. In one of the brilliant text files on his electronic bulletin board system (BBS), Richard McDonald utilized his voluminous research into the so-called 14th Amendment and related constitutional law when he made the following pleading in opposition to a traffic citation, of all things, in Los Angeles county municipal court:

The Accused Common-Law Citizen [Defendant] hereby places all parties and the court on NOTICE, that he is not a “citizen of the United States**” under the so-called 14th Amendment, a juristic person or a franchised person who can be compelled to perform to the regulatory Vehicle Codes which are civil in nature, and challenges the In Personam jurisdiction of the Court with this contrary conclusion of law. This Court is now mandated to seat on the law side of its capacity to hear evidence of the status of the Accused Citizen.

[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald’s electronic BBS]

[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]

You might be wondering why someone would go to so much trouble to oppose a traffic citation. Why not just pay the fine and get on with your life? The answer lies, once again, in the fundamental and supreme Law of our Land, the Constitution for the United States of America. Sovereign State Citizens have learned to assert their fundamental rights, because rights belong to the belligerent claimant in person. The Constitution is the last bastion of the Common Law in our country. Were it not for the Constitution, the Common Law would have been history a long time ago. The interpretation of the Constitution is directly influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law:

There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.

[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 891, 893 (1898)]

[emphasis added]

Under the Common Law, we are endowed by our Creator with the right to travel. “Driving”, on the other hand, is defined in State Vehicle Codes to mean the act of chauffeuring passengers for hire. “Passengers” are those who pay a “driver” to be chauffeured. Guests, on the other hand, are those who accompany travelers without paying for the transportation. Driving, under this definition, is a privilege for which a State can require a license. Similarly, if you are a citizen of the United States**, you are subject to its jurisdiction, and a State government can prove that you are obligated thereby to obey all administrative statutes and regulations to the letter of the law. These regulations include, of course, the requirement that all subjects apply and pay for licenses to use the State and federal highways, even though the highways belong to the People. The land on which they were built, and the materials and labor expended in their construction, were all paid for with taxes obtained from the People. Provided that you are not engaged in any “privileged” or regulated activity, you are free to travel anywhere you wish within the 50 States. Those States are real parties to the U.S. Constitution and are therefore bound by all its terms.

Another one of your Common Law rights is the right to own property free and clear of any liens. (“Unalienable” rights are rights against which no lien can be established precisely because they are un-lien-able.) You enjoy the right to own your automobile outright, without any lawful requirement that you “register” it with the State Department of Motor Vehicles. The State governments violated your fundamental rights when they concealed the legal “interest” which they obtained in your car, by making it appear as if you were required to register the car when you purchased it, as a condition of purchase. This is fraud. If you don’t believe me, then try to obtain the manufacturer’s statement of origin (“MSO”) the next time you buy a new car or truck. The implications and ramifications of driving around without a license, and/or without registration, are far beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that effective methods have already been developed to deal with law enforcement officers and courts, if and when you are pulled over and cited for traveling without a license or tags. Richard McDonald is second to none when it comes to preparing a successful defense to the civil charges that might result. A Sovereign is someone who enjoys fundamental, Common Law rights, and owning property free and clear is one of those fundamental rights.

If you have a DOS-compatible personal computer and a modem, Richard McDonald can provide you with instructions for accessing his electronic bulletin board system (“BBS”) and Internet website. There is a mountain of information, and some of his computer files were rather large when he began his BBS. Users were complaining of long transmission times to “download” text files over phone lines from his BBS to their own personal computers. So, McDonald used a fancy text “compression” program on all the text files available on his BBS. As a consequence, BBS users must first download a DOS program which “decompresses” the compressed files. Once this program is running on your personal computer, you are then free to download all other text files and to decompress them at your end. For example, the compressed file “14AMREC.ZIP” contains the documentation which proves that the so‑called 14th Amendment was never ratified. If you have any problems or questions, Richard McDonald is a very patient and generous man. And please tell him where you read about him and his work (voice: 818-703-5037, BBS: 818-888-9882). His website is at Internet domain

http://www.state-citizen.org .

As you peruse through McDonald’s numerous court briefs and other documents, you will encounter many gems to be remembered and shared with your family, friends and associates. His work has confirmed an attribute of sovereignty that is of paramount importance. Sovereignty is never diminished in delegation. Thus, as sovereign individuals, we do not diminish our sovereignty in any way by delegating our powers to State governments, to perform services which are difficult, if not impossible for us to perform as individuals. Similarly, States do not diminish their sovereignty by delegating powers to the federal government, via the Constitution. As McDonald puts it, powers delegated do not equate to powers surrendered:

Under the Constitutions, “… we the People” did not surrender our individual sovereignty to either the State or Federal Government. Powers “delegated” do not equate to powers surrendered. This is a Republic, not a democracy, and the majority cannot impose its will upon the minority because the “LAW” is already set forth. Any individual can do anything he or she wishes to do so long as it does not damage, injure, or impair the same Right of another individual. This is where the concept of a corpus delicti comes from to prove a “crime” or a civil damage.

[see MEMOLAW.ZIP on Richard McDonald’s electronic BBS]

[see also FMEMOLAW.ZIP and Appendix Y, emphasis added]

Indeed, to be a Citizen of the United States*** of America is to be one of the Sovereign People, “a constituent member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the people” [see 19 How. 404]. According to the 1870 edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the People are the fountain of sovereignty. It is extremely revealing that there is no definition of “United States” as such in this dictionary. However, there is an important discussion of the “United States of America”, where the delegation of sovereignty clearly originates in the People and nowhere else:

The great men who formed it did not undertake to solve a question that in its own nature is insoluble. Between equals it made neither superior, but trusted to the mutual forbearance of both parties. A larger confidence was placed in an enlightened public opinion as the final umpire. The people parcelled out the rights of sovereignty between the states and the United States**, and they have a natural right to determine what was given to one party and what to the other. … It is a maxim consecrated in public law as well as common sense and the necessity of the case, that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to his God and to his own conscience.

[Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 14th Edition, 1870]

defining “United States of America”

People as Sovereigns

The Preamble of the Constitution for the United States of America does not specifically define the word “People.” Nevertheless, the definition becomes apparent in the context of the other words and prior history.

END OF PART ONE

FOR PART TWO GO HERE: http://wp.me/p1jN4X-1Oi

CURRUPTION

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